Why Is There Still No Significant International Pressure to Stop Israel’s Atrocities
How is it that, despite seemingly favorable conditions, such pressure has yet to materialize in any meaningful way?
How advancing alternative narratives and policy frameworks—ones that better acknowledge the pain, sensitivities, and security concerns of both sides—might help generate such pressure?
A policy paper and analysis by the Pro-Human Campaign
International pressure is the most powerful strategic tool—arguably the only effective one—available to progressive forces to curb the destructive and dangerous extremism of Israel’s current government. On the surface, the international community is relatively united in its assessment that Israel has long been committing gross violations of Palestinian human rights—before the Gaza war and certainly after it—and that the legitimate need to fight Hamas does not justify the atrocities carried out in Gaza. This raises a pressing question: Why is there still no meaningful international pressure on Israel, and why does the limited pressure that exists fall so far short?
This is a crucial question. Although it may sound like a complaint, the intention here is not to lament but to conduct an honest examination of the failure. How can it be that this tool has not yet been deployed in full force—or anywhere near it? If we can understand why it has not been used, perhaps we can understand how to create the conditions that would encourage its use, given the urgency of restraining extremism: the horrifying situation in Gaza and beyond; the settlement-expansion plans (e.g., in E1) and attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank; the repression of opposition voices inside Israel, and more.
It is worth stressing that effective international pressure involves a range of tools—not only sanctions, and certainly not only sweeping sanctions such as a full economic boycott and severing of all trade ties, nor even necessarily a comprehensive arms embargo. Measures could include, for instance: declaring extremist ministers—or even Israel’s head of government—a persona non grata in a range of countries; targeted economic sanctions against decision-makers and senior officials implicated in atrocities in Gaza or in serious attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank; and so forth.
The Current Situation
As of now, there is almost no effective pressure on Israel, and what little exists has emerged only very recently. At times, the measures taken are both too weak to have a real impact and morally problematic in their sweeping nature, resembling collective punishment. A number of private companies, civil society organizations, and academic institutions have imposed—formally or informally—various boycotts, but not yet at a scale that could genuinely shake the Israeli market, though their effect is beginning to grow. Even Turkey, among Israel’s harshest critics, has not gone so far as to sever all trade or diplomatic ties.
Several countries have recently imposed partial arms embargoes on Israel, but not the major suppliers—the United States and Germany—which together are estimated to provide about 95% of Israel’s weaponry (apart from a few brief delays under the Biden administration, which ended with Trump’s return to office). Moreover, an arms embargo that undermines Israel’s ability to defend its citizens against severe threats is morally problematic.
On the economic front, the European Union is considering suspending cooperation with Israel in areas such as trade and R&D investment, but no final decisions have been made. Beyond this, there are some sanctions on individual settlers accused of violence against Palestinians, but nothing comparable against senior Israeli officials.
In short: as things stand, there is no significant international pressure on Israel from Western states.
Possible Reasons for the Lack of Pressure—and How They Might Be Overcome
1. The Trump Administration
The first obvious reason is the pro-Israel orientation of the Trump administration. Yet even before Trump, the picture was not dramatically different, and even within his administration there are influential actors uneasy with Israeli policy in Gaza. So it is worth exploring deeper causes.
2. The Difficulty of Defining Clear Policy Alternatives
For international pressure to be effective, it must be linked to concrete demands: “Do X or face sanctions Y.” The question, however, is what exactly Israel should be pressed to do. Given the complexity of the Gaza situation, it has been difficult to craft a set of demands that can secure a broad enough consensus. Any credible alternative model would need to address several challenges: Palestinian rights, adequate Israeli security arrangements (which are also tied to the long-term regional stability the international community seeks), the fate of hostages, and “the day after” in Gaza—and even in the West Bank. Some of these issues inevitably require agreements with Hamas or other Palestinian actors, not just with Israel.
It is unrealistic for Western states to demand that a country refrain from acting to free its kidnapped citizens from a group it itself classifies as a terrorist organization—or to dictate the precise terms of any deal it should accept. These states fear creating precedents that could constrain them in similar future situations. However, pressing Israel to apply other forms of pressure on Hamas—those not involving mass killings or starvation—could be more acceptable.
Israel should be challenged to take well-defined, basic steps that are independent of others and do not compromise its legitimate security needs—steps that could strengthen its position against Hamas and increase leverage for the release of hostages. If it fails to act, applying meaningful pressure on Netanyahu’s regime becomes easier. For example: urging Israel to allow Palestinians to establish an autonomous alternative to Hamas in areas of Gaza already liberated from the terror group’s control, building self-governance capacities, local security forces, reconstruction, and improved daily life for ordinary Gazans, while simultaneously weakening Hamas.
This requires a nuanced and sophisticated framework that acknowledges Israel’s security concerns as well as practical challenges. These concerns are not unique to Israel: they are relevant to states currently facing intense guerrilla or terrorist warfare in urban terrain, and to any state that may face such threats in the future. Yet progressive discourse in the West often ignores or downplays Israeli security needs, making it difficult to promote viable alternative models. Too often, calls for pressure are framed in maximalist terms that disregard security and stability, which in turn discourages mainstream Western policymakers from supporting them.
3. Israel’s Strength and Ability to Retaliate
Israel is a powerful state. With U.S. backing—especially under Trump—it can rely on vetoes in international forums, and even retaliatory sanctions against countries or institutions that act against it (as the U.S. did toward the ICC). Israel also has an advanced arms industry, with unique capabilities that Western militaries depend on in light of growing Russian threats (notably missile defense). Its high-tech economy is deeply integrated into global supply chains, making decoupling costly. Moreover, Israel has strong allies abroad, including right-wing and populist-right movements that are on the rise. In short, pressuring Israel comes with a price.
While this challenge cannot be eliminated, it can be mitigated. First, if pressure is framed not as hostility toward Israel but as opposition to specific policies that violate human rights—with assurances that it will be lifted (or even replaced with positive incentives) if Israel complies with international law—Israel may weigh its countermeasures more carefully. In such a context, it is less likely that the Netanyahu regime would push for all-out escalation. Second, a broad coalition of states would make it harder for Israel to retaliate against them all. Building such a coalition, however, requires broad-based agreements—including with states more sympathetic to Israel or more concerned about precedents that could affect their counterterrorism capacity. Once again, this underscores the need for an approach that integrates security considerations and precision, rather than relying solely on sweeping moral outrage.
4. Fear of Empowering Hamas and Terrorism in General
Western governments also fear that pressure on Israel could be seen as rewarding Hamas after the October 7 massacre, potentially boosting terrorism’s appeal as an “effective” tool worldwide. They also worry that weakening Israel might harden Hamas’s stance in hostage negotiations.
This fear can be addressed. A smart design of pressure-and-incentives could ensure that if Hamas rejects a fair deal Israel agrees to, some of the pressure on Israel would be eased—thus rewarding Israeli compromise and punishing Hamas intransigence. Conversely, if Israel rejects a fair deal, pressure should increase. More broadly, it is essential to frame international pressure as a response to Israel’s disproportionate and unlawful conduct—not as a response to the terrorist attack itself. Were Israel fighting terror strictly within international law, no such pressure would have been applied; indeed, it might even have received support.
5. Low Priority in Domestic Politics
For most governments, Israel-Palestine simply ranks low on the political agenda, as domestic concerns dominate elections. While younger generations in the West are increasingly mobilized on this issue, their numbers remain too small to be electorally decisive. Another way to raise urgency is to emphasize the costs of Middle East instability for Western countries as well: radicalization among Muslim youth in the West, social tensions between Muslims, Jews, pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli groups, rising oil and energy prices, disruptions to global trade (including Houthi attacks on shipping), massive migration flows, and regional conflicts with potential global spillover. Framing the issue in terms of concrete geopolitical interests—not just moral arguments—could broaden its resonance. Yet, this approach is rarely deployed by progressives.
6. The Problematic Image of Pressure Advocates
Many of the groups calling for international pressure on Israel—civil society organizations, international NGOs, activist networks—frame the issue in ways that alienate mainstream actors. Their one-sided narratives, which downplay or dismiss Israeli security concerns, make governments wary of being associated with them (especially due to possible associations with BDS). As a result, their ability to build broad-based alliances is weakened.
Conclusion
The ability to generate effective international pressure on Israel depends on adopting a broader, more nuanced approach. This entails taking Israeli security needs into account, being mindful of counterterrorism precedents, considering wider geopolitical factors, and understanding the complex feedback loops that perpetuate the conflict.
Currently, the leading advocates of such pressure—human rights organizations and progressive movements—are far from this approach. Instead, they often aim their rhetoric at mobilizing a radicalized youth base in the West, whose influence on governments and institutions is limited and unlikely to yield a broad coalition of states willing to pressure Israel. The paradox is that those most committed to pressuring Israel may in practice be undermining that very goal.
What is needed is a shift toward a more complex narrative—one that takes into account the security needs of both peoples, the requirement for regional stability, geopolitical interests, and the sensitivities of mainstream policymakers. Such a narrative must also outline practical unilateral steps Israel can take—steps that do not require cooperation from Hamas or other third parties but that nonetheless address basic Palestinian rights and enable the emergence of a legitimate alternative to Hamas governance in Gaza, for the benefit of both peoples.
In addition, the discourse must connect with Western geopolitical interests, so that advocacy is not conducted only in moral terms but also in pragmatic, utilitarian ones. Only then can we hope to open genuine channels of influence and move toward meaningful international pressure.
